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Summary findings
Welfare economics develops the logic of how the gains  imports - dominated for more than a decade in the
of the gainers a. I the losses of the losers  should  be  nineteenth century. It eventually  split the Tory party.
weighed against each other, in a specific ethical  Britain's transformation from an agrarian nation to a
framework. Political  economy develops the logic of how  manufacturing one spcllcd the decline of the power of
they wilt be weighed against each other, in the context of  the landed aristocracy and the ascendance of
sociopolitical institutions.  manufacturing. IIL the end, the Corn Laws  were repealed
Kanbur applies the disciplines  of both welfare  because of the growing power of the urban masses  and
economics and political economy in this evaluation of  their employers,  and the debate soon turned to
policy reform in Ghana. When considerations from both  protection against imports from fast-industrializing
disciplines  are aligned, he explains, policy r'form  not  France and Germany.
only should be enacted but is also likely to be enacted.  Such episodes from history help us understand the
Often, though, there is no such alignment, so reforms  protection of rice in Japan today, for-example,  and -
that might improve social  welfare do not succeed.  the focus of this paper - the past decade of reform in
Anal,  says  Kanbur, should consider past reforms  Ghana, and thie  decade that awaits.
from both perspectives,  and should leam from history, in  Kanbur argues that the political economy of policy
evaluating proposed reform - so they can assess  both  reform in Ghana is likely to prove tougher in the second
the desirability  and the feasibility  of reform.  decade than in the first, for three reasons: (1) the
Policymakers,  on the other hand, should work toward  economic situation in the second decade is no longer one
organizing and mobilizing  the gainers from reform that  of absolute disaster, with only one way to go; (2) in the
would advance social  welfare, so that resiscance  to such  second decade, policy  reform will have to coincide with
reform by the losers can be overcome.  the transition from military to constitutional rule; and
In an example from history, he explains that Britain's  (3) the nature of the reforms to be undertaken in the
debate over the Corn Laws  - basically  a device for  second decade is different from tbat of those undertaken
protecting domestic  production of grain from cheap  in the first
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Welfare  Economics,  Political  Economy  and Policy  Reform  in Ghana
by
Ravi  Kanbur
The World  Bank
1.  Introduction: Economic  Policy  Reform
The subject  of this paper is as old as the subject  of economics,  but one which
is in the forefront  of African  policy  making  today.  Some  of the classical  writings  in
economics  arise from the need to analyze  various  economic  policy reforms;  yet the moming
newspaper  headlines  are also full of the latest  twists  and turns in the reform saga. And, what
is more, the issue of economic  policy  reform  is global--it  is not one specific  to Africa.
Tr, read some  recent writings,  one might  think that economic  policy reform  was a-peculiarly
African  phenomenon.  Yet there has been hardly  an epoch  in history  where the issue was not
prominent,  and there is hardly  a region  in the world  where the major  debates  of the time do
not centre around  economic  policy  reform. Even if we take  as distant  a time as the  -middle
of the nineteenth  century,  the debate  in Britain  over the Corn Laws dominated  the political
landscape  for over a decade; it eventually  split the Tory party, and the final  outcome  was a
reflection  of the emerging  socio-economic  transformation  of the nation from an agrarian  past
to a dominant  future  as the workshop  of the world. It also spelt the beginning  of the end of
the power of the landed  aristocracy,  and the start of the dominance  of manufcturing. And it2
was to help elucidate  and analyze  the issues  involved  that David  Ricardo  developed  what we
now call the "Ricardian"  model  of the distribution  of income  between  classes.
The issues  in the Corn Laws  debate  were simple.  Stripped  of their institutional
garb, they were a device  for protecting  domestic  production  of com from cheap  imports.
Sounds  familiar?  It should,  because  the same question  comes  up in our newspapers,  in Ghana
and elsewhere,  every day of the year.  Cheap  imports  would,  of course, help producers  at
the expense  of consumers.  All of the usual  arguments  about the "national  interest", *food
security', etc., were made  at the time. The battle  lines were drawn up very clearly. The
Economist  magazine  was founded  in 1843  specifically  to argue the case against  the Corn
Laws, and it has maintained  its Free trade position  ever since.
At the end of the day, it was not necessarily  the elegant  economic  modelling  of
Ricardo,  nor the elegant  and stylish  economic  journalism  of The Economist,  which won the
day.  The Corn Laws  were in fact repealed,  but it was the growing  numbers  and the growing
power of the urban masses,  and their employers,  which spelled  the doom of that particular
piece of protection.  It goes without  saying  that very soon the debate  turned to the protection
of manufacturing  against  the imports  from fast industrialising  Germany  and France. Not
surprisingly,  the urban  population  was now in favor of protection-citing,  yet again, the
national  interest.  I am sure that te  irony of this was not lost on The Economist,  which
steadfastly  maintained  its Free Trade position.3
But why go to nineteenth century Britain? Why not look in our own times at
one of the most economically powerful nations on earth-Japan?  Let us look, in fact, at rice
policy in Japan, which bears an uncanny resemblance to the Corn Laws in Britain a century
and a half ago. Through various means and devices, the importation of rice into has been
hindered when not directly banned or deterred by punitive tariffs. One does not need fancy
economics to surmise that the main beneficiaries of this policy are the rice farmers, and the
main losers must be rice consumers. Whatever the true national interest, it is a fact that
farmers'  interests have, so far, been protected.  The political economy of this is in some
ways simple, in other ways, complex. It is recognised that the method of election to the
Japanese Parliament favors the rural constituencies in which rice farmers live. Also, although
urban rice consumers pay more for rice as a result of the rice policy, the links between urban
dwellers and their rural folk have, until now, been strong. Moreover, it is difficult to
underestimate the cultural significance of rice in Japan.
No wonder, then, that protection of rice in Japan has proved difficult to
dislodge from the outside. However, careful observers of the Japanese scene were already
saying some years ago what others have started saying in recent years, in the wake of
Japanese-American trade negotiations.  This is that as the socio-economic and demographic
transfornations  underway in Japan gradually work their way through, support for rice
protection will become more and more of an anachronism. As a generation grows up in
Japan that had  even less to do with the countryside than its parents and grandparents, and as4
electoral reform evens out the distribution of power, the internal forces supporting rice
protection will  begin to crumble.  In fact, this is already happening before our very eyes.
I want to draw two main conclusions from the above discussion of economic
policy reform. The first is that the issue of economic policy reforn  was not invented in the
1980's in Africa-it  has always been with us, everywhere. The second is that economic
policy reform is about gainers and losers. There are bound to be losers from policy
reform-and  these  will fight, perhaps viciously, to stop it. But there are also likely to be
winners-history  has shown that these are not as likely to push for reform with the same
vigor, but there comes a point when their interests become overwhelming and opposition
crumbles.
Thus economic policy reform is to do with gainers and losers. This is why
economic policy reform touches upon two aspects of the subject of economics-welfare
economics on the one hand, and political economy on the other. The former develops the
logic of how the gains of the gainers and the losses of the losers should be weighed against
each other, in the context of particular ethical frameworks; the latter analyses how the gains
of the gainers and the losses of the losers will be weighed against each other, in the context
of the institutions of a particular socio-political system.
2.  Welfare Economics and Political Economy5
By many accounts, the term Welfare Economics was coined by the great
economist A.C. Pigou. In modem economics, the term has come to characterise that part of
the subject that develops the logic of choosing between different policy options, by reference
to their consequences for the welfare, or the well being, of individuals in a society. As seen
from the discussion in the last section, every comparison of policy options will almost
certainly lead to a comparison of gainers versus losers. Thus it is incumbent upon welfare
economics to provide us with a framework for making such comparisons.
The history of welfare economics in the first half of this century was, more or
less, to avoid this issue.  The Utilitarians of the nineteenth century, and their twentieth
century followers, had no difficulty in comparing and, in fact, in 'Tadding  up" pleasure and
pain, gains and losses, across individuals. But some in the following century, most notably
Lionel Robbins and his followers, felt that economics did not have any special competence to
pronounce on such matters-which required "value  judgements". The only case that Robbins
was willing to allow for comparison was the case named after Vilfiedo Pareto-this  was the
case of a Pareto improvement, when a policy change made nobody worse off and some
people better off.
Of course, such a restriction meant that economists could never pronounce, or
help to pronounce, on any policy reform that was actually likely to be undertaken, and the
first half of this century saw many a case of intellectual gymnastics designed to get the
economist, Houdini-like, out of the clutches of this straight jacket. Thus Kaldor and Hicks6
proposed  "compensation  criteria". A policy reform could be pronounced  a social
improvement,  even  though  there were gainers  and losers, if the gainers  could compensate  the
losers to leave them as well off as they were before, and still have  something  left over for
themselves. The crucial point is that the compensation  need only be paid hypothetically,  not
actually.  The logical  conundrum  should  now be clear. If the compensation  was actually  paid,
we could appeal  straightforwardly  to the uncontroversial  Pareto criterion.  But if the
compensation  was not paid, then there could be no argument  whatsoever  for ignoring  the
losses  of the losers  relative to the gains  of the gainers.
In the second  half of the twentieth  century-actually,  more like in its third
quarter-a group of economists,  led by Amartya  Sen, Anthony  Atkinson  and Joseph
Stiglitz-accepted  that gains and losses  were the natural business  of policy reform, that these
could and should  be compared  and, moreover,  the comparison  should  be related to the
measurement  of inequality  and poverty  in society.  Thus, it was argued, analysis  of policy
cannot  be done without  value  judgements.  In fact, it is naive  to think that such a value free
analysis  can be accomplished.  ,What  is important,  however,  is that the value  judgements  be
made  explicit  and above  board-so that we ali know  what somebody  means  when  they invoke
the "national  interest".  The job of the welfare  economist  is to develop  frameworks  in which
value  judgements  can be rationally  discussed  and made  precise  and, by the same token, to
expose and to lay bare the value  judgements  underlying  policy claims.To my mind, the most  appealing  criterion  for evaluating  policy reform  is its
impact on poverty-in other words on the well being of those  at the bottom  of society  as
measured  by their income,  their consumption,  or their fulfillment  of basic needs and access
to basic social services.  This is my value  judgement,  but I believe  it to be widely  shared.
However,  stating  the value  judgement  in general terms is only the first.  step. The real
difficulties  start when  we try to operationalise  the concept  of poverty  and to taclde  the tough
questions  of tradeoffs  between  the short term and the long term.
This is not the place  to discuss  in detail the massive  literature  on poverty
measurement.  Suffice  it to say that, despite  the huge conceptual.  and empirical  problems,  we
now have  a basis on which  we can discuss  coherently  the imDlications  of policy reform for
the poor. Every reform  .creates  gainers  and losers. The identity  of gainers  and losers will be
determined  by the nature of the reform and by the nature  of the economic  structure  being
reformed.  Thus, for example,  reducing  a tariff will benefit  consumers  of the commodity  and
hurt the producers.  Now, there are rich and poor consumers  and rich and poor producers  (in
the latter group  I am including  the workers  who work in the factories  that produce the good
in question).  So some  poor will get hurt, and some  poor will benefit.  How to aggregate  these.
disparate  effects?  And aggregate  we must, because  if we say no to a policy reform  even if a
singlepoor person  gets hurt, there wMl  never be any policy  reform. One way to pose the
question  is as follows:  Are the gainers  on average  richer or poorer than the losers?  If the.
answer  is that the gainers  are on average  poorer than the losers, that is an argument  for
supporting  the reform.  The same applies  to any reform  at all, not just trade policy reform. If8
there are to be cuts in public expenditure,  we have  to tell the full story. What would  happen
without  the cuts? How would the expenditure  be financed? By higher  taxes? Who would
bear the burden  of this? By increased  fiscal  deficit  and thus  higher inflation? Who would
bear the burden  of this? And so on. The welfare economics  approach  to evaluation  policy
reform  is thus  very clear. For each reform,  or for the reform  package  as a whole, we first
describe  the consequences  for gainers  and losers, and then ascertain  whether,  on average, the
gainers  are richer or poorer  than the losers.
The calculus  of welfare  economics  may not be of much use in assessing  the
political  economy  of policy  reform. Here what matters  is how gainers  and losers form
coalitions  and use the institutions  of politics  to advance  their cause. The outcome  depends  not
only on the nature  of the reform, but also on the nature  of the political  system.  One feature  -
of many  refonns, particularly  in the trade area, is that the gainers  from reforms  are
numerous but each gains relatively small amount, while the losers are small in number but
each loses a large amount.  The political  outcome  thus depends  critically  on the threshold  at
which  a gain  or a loss becomes  sufficiently  significant  for an individual  or a group for them
to begin organising  themselves.  Typically,  removal  of tariffs  benefits  each of millions  of
consumers  by a small  amount  (shirts  are cheaper,  say), but hurts each of a small  number  of
producers  by a lot (eg textile  workers  lose their  jobs). There  is then a built in bias against
reform, because  the intensity  of the losers  in support  of their  cause will be far greater. The
political  system  in place is also important. Lester Thurow  wrote a book about America  some
years  ago in which  he pointed  out that the American  political  system  essentially  permitted9
well organised  interest  groups, no matter  how small, to block change. The conclusion  he
drew from this was that there had to be a national  consensus  on distribution  on the basis of
which change  could be advanced--otherwise  America  would fall further and further  behind.
Thus  the rules under which a blocking interest group can be overcome are also important in
the political  economy  of the reform process.
-3.  Economic  Policy  Reform  in Ghana, 1983-1993
With the above  framework  in mind, let us now tum to the Ghana  story. The
story is well known, and has been told many times before. But it may benefit by a retelling
from even  a slightly  different  perspective.  The basic features  of the Economic  Recovery
Program (;RP), launched  in 1983,  are by now well known. The effects  on the
macroeconomic  performance,  as measured  by real GDP growth, are also well known.  After a
decade  of real GDP declining  at 1% per annum,  in the decade  following  1983  real GDP rose
at 5% per annum.
The first question  to ask is-was it all simply  due to the pouring  in of aid? The
answer  is no. During this period Ghana  suffered  severe  terms of trade losses, and the aid
flows barely managed  to compensate  for this. The growth  came from somewhere  else.
Another  way to look at this is to do the following  back  of the envelope  calculation.  External
assistance  is around  8% of GDP. Even  if as much  as 50% of this went into investment
(investment  is around 10-15%  of GDP in Ghana),  and even  if we take a relatively  generous10
value for the incremental  capital  output  ratio of 2, this inflow  would, on its own, account  for
only about 2 percentage  points of the growth  rate. Something  else was clearly going on.
That something  else was a surge  in public investment,  and this seems  to me to
be the real story of the ERP decade.  In 1983,  government  revenue  (excluding  aid) had fallen
to 5% of GDP. Clearly,  this is not enough  to provide  the basic infrastructure  necessary  in an
economy  (roads, electricity,  water, telephones,  etc), on which private investment  relies. Not
surprisingly,  private  investnent had itseli almost  disappeared.  In addition,  investment  in
social  infrastructure  had also gpound  to a halt. With no revenue  of its own, the government
couldn't  provide  the basic public goods. Jonathan  Frimpong-Ansah  has recently  analysed  the
anatomy  of this.  decline.  To use his.  colorful  phrase "the Vampire  State"  had sucked  so much
blood from its prey that there was no more  to be had. To use another image,  the state was
lling the goose  that laid the golden  eggs. To use more  prosaic  economic  language,  the
regime of controls  ensured  that most activity  was in illegal,  and therefore  non-taxable
channels.
The most important  of these  controls  were on the foreign  exchange  marketL
When the black  market  rate is thirty times  the official  rate, as was the case in 1983,  you
don't need to be a genius  to know that the govemment  is losing huge amounts  of revenue
through  customs  duties. When  there is an import  licensing  regime  instead  of a tariff regime,
you know that revenue  that should  come  to the government  is going into the hands  of theofficials and traders who are dividing up the scarcity value of the commodity between
themselves. And so on.
As the external sector was libiralized, government  revenue shot up, as activity
came back into taxable channels. The szrengthening  of the revenue raising agencies also
helped. By 1991, government revenue (excluding  aid) was running at 15% of GDP. This is a
remarkable transformation  by any standards. Government expenditure, particularly
investment in economic infrastructure, rose parl passu. Expenditure  on the social sectors also
increased. And all this at a time when inflation fel  from three digits to 10% per annum.
TO my mind, the increase in government expenditure  on basic infrastructure is
the key feature of the decade of the ERP. But it was made possible by other aspects of the
Policy mix, in parficular, the external sector liberalization.  There were also, of course, other
features of the reform process, such as the move to ensure that cocoa farmers got a higher
share of the world price of cocoa, which were also successful. There were yet other aspects
which did not get as far,-  such as the divestiture prgram  or the program to restructure the
public service. We will come to these presently.
As noted in the previous section, there were bound to be gainers and losers out
of the reform process.  And there would be poor people amongst the gainers and the losers.
What, taldng the welfare economics  question first, would be the consequences  for the poor of
the ERP?. The first point to make is that this is not an easy question to answer with12
certainty. We simply do not have the "before and after" data to provide a clean analysis.
What we do have is a poverty profile of the country in the middle of this period on which to
anchor corroborative evidence from different sources. The second point to make is that even
if we had the best data in the world, we have a basic conceptual problem to do with the
counterfactual. What is the ERP period being compared against? Against what would have
happened  if things would have gone on as in the previous decade? Or against some
alternative policy mix that, it is claimed, would have been better? There is no simple answer
to these questions.
The basic fact to hang on to is that in the decade previous to the ERP real
GDP in Ghana fell by 1% per annum. It would take a real stretch of the imagination to argue
that this could have been good for the poor had it gone on. During the decade of the ERP,
real GDP grew at 5% per annum. This is clearly better, but it is likely that this figure does
not fully reflect what happened to the money in individual pockets because a large part of the
increase went into pubic  investment. In otiher  words, national income may have gone up at
5% per annum, but national consumption  did not, because public investment  went up at a
faster rate. Even so, it must be better than growth at minus 1  % per annum!
Who were gainers and the losers from the foreign exchange liberalization?  The
main gainer was the govemment, which got revenue that was previously going out as rents to
the black market. The main losers were clearly those who had privileged access to foreign
exchange  at the subsidized official rate. Are these likely to be the poorest of the poor?13
Hardly.  The gainers  from government  expenditure  were those  who benefit  from basic  public
infrastructure  such as better roads, more regular  electricity  and water supply,  better
telephone  communications,  as well as more expenditure  in the social  sectors. This would  be
a mixed  bunch,  consisting  of the poor and not so poor.
A word  about the removal  of subsidies,  or rather, the introduction  of user
charges,  which  was another  feature  of the ERP. Who gains  and who loses from a subsidy?
Obviously,  those  who manage  to have access  to the subsidy  gain, and the losers  are those  on
whom  the incidence  of taxation  to raise the money  for this subsidy  falls.  The point about
access  to the subsidy,  whether  it be for fertliser or for drugs, is important.  A general
subsidy  will reach  the poor provided  there is sufficient  budget  to back up the access for all
those  who demand  it. When  the budget  isn't there, access  will be rationed,  and who gets a
look in depends  on the rationing  mechanism  that is adopted,  implicitly  or explictly. We can
be fairly certain  that the very poor will not get a look  in. They do not have  the contacts  or
whatever  is needed  to ensure  access  to that subsidized  bag of fertiliser  or those  prescription
drugs.  The rich will always  be alright-they  can use their  contacts  or bribe their way into the
rationing  queue.  Then there will be some  groups  of people  such as the lower  rungs of civil
servants  who may get access  because  of institutional  features  such  as free drugs for the
emnployees  of the health  ministry,  etc. These  are the groups who will lose as a result of the
removal  of the subsidy-they  are not the very rich, but they are not very poor either. And
they are organised;  but we will come  to the political  economy  presently.  The macroeconomc
data show  that by 1983  there must have  been widespread  rationing  of the so called14
subsidies-since government revenue and hence expenditure  had fallen to all time lows. In
this context, recognising  that the budget simply cannot support the range of subsidies that
exist is an important first step.  One way to fill the gap is cost recovery, unless expenditure
is cut elsewhere, or revenue is raised. Even if revenue is raised, as it was in Ghana, the
question still remains as to whether to spend this on subsidies or to invest it in basic
economic infrastructure. These are difficult questions, but they must not be complicated
further by the image of a 'golden age" where subsidies were indeed available to everybody,
including the poor. Even if this was the case immediately  after independence  it was not
sustainable, and in any case by 1983 it had ceased to be true.
Despite the conceptual  and data difficulties inherent in answering the question,
the welfare economics  evaluation of the ERP would, in my opinion, be pos.tive. A positive
growth rate is better for the poor than a negative growth rate-at  least, it would be a strange
situation if the reverse was the case.  And when we look at the components  of the reform
package, there are many elements that can be characterised  as either being directly beneficial
to the poor, or at least not harming them greatly.  This is not to say that no poor people lost
out, nor is it to say that everything  is fine for the future.  Rather we must learn from the
lessons of the past decade to fashion the reform program of the next.
What of the political economy of the reform process'? It would be too easy to
simply attribute everthing  to the fact there was a military govemment in Ghana during this
period. As Jonathan Frimpong-Ansah  shows in his analysis of the political economy of15
decline from independence  to 1983, and as Clark LCi'Lh  and others have shown, a similar play
of forces continued through military and democratic regimes. The basic feature was that the
state kept squeezing the productive sectors to the point where they could not or would not
yield up any more resources to grease the wheels of political compromise. It was this more
than anything else, according to Frimpong-Ansah  and others, that led to the turnaround. The
economy had hit rock bottom, and there was only one way to go. This was the defining
feature of 1983.
4.-  The Second Decade of Reform in Ghana
The first decade of the ERP, 1983-1993, was an undoubted success. But the
nature of the success, and its limitations  must also be borne in mind. As argued above, the
ERP is actually a brilliant example of a public sector led recovery which has gone a long
way towards restoring the basic infrastructure without which private investment  cannot take
off. However, the time is now ripe for the baton to be handed over to the private sector. The
public sector cannot continue to grow at the rate at which it has grown during the ERP.  Key
reforms such as divestiture of state owned enterprises have not been undertaken. Moreover,
the Public Service itself needs restructring  and downsizing to focus on the core areas that
the state should have responsibility  for.
Despite the fact that the growth rate during the ERP period averaged around
5% per annum, which was far superior to the minus 1% in the decade before, ftis level is16
not good enough. With population growth running at 3% per annum, this will produce a
maximum increase in consumption per capita of 2% per annum. At this rate, Ghana will take
up to half a century to reach the ranks of the middle income countries.  This is the sense in
which the ERP growth performance, although  brilliant, has to be bettered.  A double digit
growth rate is what is needed to make a significant  dent in poverty in our lifetimes.  Even if
we take a more modest growth rate of 8% per annum as the target, this will require an
increase in the investment ratio of 60%. In 1991 the ratio of investment to GDP was 16%. In
other words, in order to achieve a growth target of 8% per annum investment will have to
increase by 10 percentage points of GDP to 26%.
Where will this increase come from? We can think of the sources as being
foreign or domestic, and private or public.  Starting with domestic/private,  it has to be said
that there is not much scope for dramatic increases in the household saving ratio, given the
low level of incomes in Ghana.  Typically, increases in household  savings come after
increases in household  incomes, not before.  Turning now to the foreign/public category, in
other words aid, there is not much s.cope  in the m,edium  term for an increase in this-and  it
can be argued that aid dependence  should in fact be reduced.  This leaves the two remaining
categories-domestic/public and foreign/private. The former is simply public sector savings,
while the latter is foreign direct investment  What is needed, therefore, is for the public
sector to  run a surplus of 5% of GDP, and for foreign direct investment to rise from its
present derisory figure to 5% of GDP.17
Both these are problematic. The 5 % public sector surplus will require more
revenue raising but also cuts in public expenditure, at least as a share of GDP.  The iatter
cannot come from basic economic  or social infrastructure. The selling off of loss malking
enterprises can have a good budgetary  as well as a good signalling effect. Downsizing  and
contracting out of many public services, and a hard look at many of Ghana's 150 or so
"subvented organisations' is also called for. The rise in foreign direct investment
pre-supposes that there exist the incentives to attract such investment, and that many of the
features which previously frightened off such investment have been removed.  Ghana has
come a long way in this area, but much remains to be done. Divestiture will also help-there
is nothing like the. suspicion created by a lingering state owned enterprise in a sector to hold
back fresh investment, whether domestic or foreign. It must also be admitted that the
political economy of a surge in foreign investment will have to be managed.  A public
education  campaign and leadership will be needed to overcome public attitudes that owe
much to the colonial legacy.
Will there be demand for the products of the new investment? The key here is
that Ghana, a small economy, has no option but to hook itself into the global market place by
staying outward oriented and developing  an aggressive strategy of promoting exports.  The
trade libalisaton  of the ERP decade was important, as has been noted, in removing
controls that otherwise drove economic activity onto non-taxable  channels.  But it was also
important in giving Ghana an outward orientation. This should not now be reversed in the
face of populist demands.  However, much more attention  should be devoted than was in the18
ERP decade to the promotion of non-traditional exports. Institutional and other
non-discriminatory  support should be forthcoming.
Growth by itself will not have as dramatic an  effect on poverty reduction as if
the growth was equitably distributed. The experience of fast growing countries that had a
dramatic reduction in poverty, compared to equally fast growing economies that did not,
suggests two differences. The former (primarily countries in East Asia) have kept an outward
orientation and flexible labor markets that have allowed the fruits of growth to benefit the
factor of production that the poor possess in abundance--their  labor. Moreover, they have
maintained  a broad based pattern of public expenditure  on basic health, basic education and
basic infrastructure. Such a reorientation of public expenditure must be a high priority for
Ghana in an era of restraint on government expenditure.
-Using  a broad sweep, we might perhaps characterise the sorts of reforms that
have been or are in progress in  Africa into two categories. Type I or Phase-  I reforms
include the following:
- restoration of macroeconomic  balanoe
- establishing of realistic exchange rates
- removal of quantitative  controls, particularly in trade
- - reduction of taxes on agriculture
- rehabilitation of basic infIastructure
Type It-or Phase II reforms include the following:
private sector development;export  promotion
divestiture of state owned enterprises
public sector restructuring and downsizing in some areas19
financial sector rehabilitation and liberalisation
reallocation  of public  investment  and expenditure  towards  basic health,
education  and infrastructure
Now the actual  sequence  followed  in any one country  may include  a mix of
these  types  of reforms.  Moreover,  the reforms  are linked-we have  already  noted how
exchange  rate reform  provided  the revenue  increases  that underpinned  the increased
expenditure  on rehabilitating  economic  infrastructure.  However,  it would  be true to say that
in a country  like Ghana,  which  is perhaps  the furthest  along  on the reform road, Type II
reforms  are still on the agenda,  and they can therefore  be described  as Phase  II reforms.
Type I reforms  have  certain  features  worth  noting. They  are in many  cases
'stroke of the pen' reforms.  Changing  the official  exchange  rate is a good example  of a
policy  reform that can  be done by the stroke  of a pen, as is the lowering  of taxes on
agriculture,  particularly  when  this is done through  giving  higher  producer  prices. Another
feature of Type I reforms is that their benefits come through very quickly (there are costs
too, of course, but my point here focuses  on the benefits).  Equalization  of official  and black
market  exchange  rates leads to an overnight  jump in government  revenues.  Raising  producer
prices  affects  cross-border  smuggling  immediately.  More  public  expenditure  on roads
inproves their quality  discernably  straight  away. Removing  trade controls  puts goods  on
shelves  rapidly. And so on.20
Type II reforms,  on the other  hand, are more institutional  in nature. Many  of
them, such  as divestiture,  face legal  and other  hurdles.  They take  time. Reorienting  public
expenditure  requires  first that an adequate  expenditure  monitoring  and control  mechanism  be
put in place-otherwise  budgets  and actuals  bear no relation  to each  other. At the same time,
the costs of many  of the Type II reforms  come  through  almost  immediately,  while the
benefits  remain  in some  unquantified  future. The costs  of public sector  downsizing  are
palpable-they  will probably  be demonstrating  outside  the door of the responsible  minister  the
day aftr  (o- the day before)  the announcement.  The same  is true of layoffs  brought  about  as
a result of divestiture.  Yet the benefits  of divestiture  in terms of the expected  surge  in
investment  and so on are always  in the future,  and difficult  to quantify.  This is very different
from the revenue  effects  of exchange  rate liberalisation-  which  can be forecast  accurately  and
which  come  through  quickly.
I have  referred to Type I and Type II reforms  also as Phase  I and Phase  II
reforms  because,  by and large, this is the sequence  that African  countries  in general,  and
Ghana  in particular,  seem  to be following.  I have  also argued that this is, broadly  speaking,
the right sequence  to follow.  The Welfare  Economics  evaluation  of Phase  I reforms  for
Ghana  suggests  strongly  that, overall  and on average,  they have  been  a success.  But it also
suggests  that Phase  II reforms  are needed  because  without  them we will not get the growth
with equity  needed  to make  a significant  dent in poverty  within  a lifetime.  However,  it
should  be clear that the political  economy  of Phase  II reforms  is different  from that of Phase
I reforms.  Many  of the costs of the former  are upfront,  while the benefits  do not necessarily- 21
come through quickly. The losers are thus likely to organise against the reforms, and the
potential gainers are likely to be skeptical. Pushing for these reforms will look like a leap of
a faith.
Putting all this together, in the case of Ghana it is clear that the political
economy of the reform process is likely to be very different in the second decade after the
launch of ERP than it was in the first decade, for three reasons. First,  1983 was a rock
bottom year; in 1993, thanks to the success of the first decade, the economy is no longer at
rock bottom.  It has been argued that coalition formation for reform would be much easier in
the first set of circumstances. Second, in the decade starting in  1993 there is a regime switch
from a military government to a constitutional  govemment. The mere fact of such a regime
switch will make the process of reform different-for example, until the institutions of the
Constitution have settled down relative to each other, the passage  of reforms will have to
traverse uncharted waters. Third, as noted above, the nature of the reforms still left to be
done is very different from the reforms undertaken  in Phase I. Phase n reforms are such that
the distribution and timing of costs and benefits are more likely to give an upper hand to the
likely losers than to the likely winners.
What all this means is that if there is to be an alignment of welfare economics
and political economy in the second decade of reforms in Ghana,as there was in the first
decade, the reformers will have to pay close attention to marshalling  the forces of those
liEly  to benefit from the reforms in the long run, to convince them of this argument and22
bring them  into the national  debate.  Such  public  education  is essendal  because  only with the
implementation  of the second  phase  of reforms  can there be the surge  of equitable  growth
that is needed  to eradicate  poverty  within  a generation.
5.  Conclusion
This essay  has considered  the sub-disciplines  of Welfare  Economics  and
Political  Economy  as two frameworks  for evaluating  policy  reform  and applied  them to the
case of Ghana. When  the two sets of considerations  are aligned,  policy  reform not only
should  be enacted,  it is also  likely to be enacted. Quite  often, though,  we do not have  such
an alignment,  so that reforms  which  might  improve  social  welfare  do not get through. The
agenda  for analysts  is to consider  past reforms  from these  two perspectives  in order to leam
from history,  and to evaluate  proposed  reforms  in the same  way, so that the feasibility  and
desirability  of refonns can be assessed. The agenda  for policy  makers  is to work towards
oranizing and mobilizing  the gainers  from reforms  which  advance  social  wefare, so that
resistance  to such  refonns from the losers  can be overcome. The first decade  of reform  in
Ghana  presents  the results  of such  alignment. The second  decade  of reform  now awaits.23
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